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to perform. Social commitments in the form of contractual obligations from one agent to another have been advocated to define formal semantics for ACL messages. 1, 2 Social commitments also provide powerful representation for modeling and reasoning about multi-agent interaction protocols without restricting agents' autonomy and flexibility. They also provide natural ways to characterize degrees of autonomy and interdependency without getting bogged down in low-level details. Thus, the agent communication research community has agreed that any formal semantics for ACL messages within heterogeneous systems must be supported by high-level abstractions rather than reasoning about agents' mental states (e.g., beliefs). 3 Previous proposals for multi-agent commitment protocols have considered the semantics of conditional commitments-a natural and universal frame of social commitment-and how to check their compliance with protocol specifications. 4 The basic idea of conditional commitments is that the debtor agent can only commit to the creditor agent (in what's also called a commitment consequence) when specific antecedents are met-for instance, the seller commits to the buyer to ship the requested goods if the buyer sends the agreed payment. However, such proposals don't capture some of the subtleties that arise in concrete applications in which commitments (typically representing contracts) have implicit or explicit temporal orderings and emphasize the existence of at least one option to satisfy their assigned conditions. An important aspect of social commitments is that they can be manipulated through a set of actions. 2, 4 Such manipulations provide the primary way to evolve changes in social commitment states and to define commitment life cycles. 2 A commitment can be present in one state at a time and continues in that state until an action is carried out on it. Such actions are typically classified into twoparty actions (such as Discharge (or Fulfill) and Violate) and three-party actions (such as Delegate and Assign). For instance, when a commitment consequence is true (that is, the seller delivers the requested goods), the commitment is fulfilled.
Current semantic models for fulfilling commitments nevertheless have a spurious paradox resulting from the counterintuitive assumption that "the commitment should be active when it comes time to its fulfillment." 4, 5 Suppose, for example, that a customer commits to give $500 to a merchant. As soon as that money is transferred to the merchant's account, the commitment is immediately fulfilled. By considering this assumption, the commitment to sending $500 is still active, but it would be ridiculous to force the customer to send the money again. Technically, such an assumption violates a principle that's commonly accepted in the literature: 2, 6 when a commitment is fulfilled, it should no longer be active, meaning that the fulfillment action results in a state where the active commitment is marked as resolved.
Here, we distinguish a subtype of conditional commitments called strong commitments. Classical commitments are those that can be activated even if the antecedent will never be satisfied (see Example 1 below), whereas strong commitments are only activated when there's a possibility of satisfying the antecedents (see Example 2 below). We propose an operational framework for conditional commitments that's expressive and rich enough to accommodate practical business scenarios. Because it's unknown in advance whether a party will fulfill its commitment, checking whether the commitment is violated is significant, especially as interacting agents are heterogeneous. In our framework, when there's no way to fulfill strong (or classical) commitments, the commitment is violated. Indeed, the companion contribution of this article lies in developing a symbolic algorithm to solve the problem of model-checking conditional commitments and their ful fillments or violations. (Model checking is a formal and fully automatic verification technique at design time that increases confidence in a system's safety, efficiency, and robustness. 7 ) This type of model-checking algorithm is entirely missing in the literature and would help designers detect and eliminate design errors so that commitment protocols (a set of commitment action meanings on which agents agree) comply with specifications before any interactions start at runtime.
Real-World Challenges
To describe our motivation for distinguishing strong conditional commitments as a particular subset of classical conditional commitments, we use situational examples that arise in practical applications of online or offline business contracts. We present formalizations of these examples later. Example 1. Consider the NetBill protocol modeled by using event calculus. 6 Social commitments conventionally let us flexibly specify this protocol, enabling us to begin an interaction in one of the following ways: a merchant commits to present an offer without receiving a request from a customer (as happens for advertising 8 ); a merchant can commit to deliver some goods for trial without asking a customer to accept the price; or a customer commits to accept the price quote before the merchant proposes one, mimicking the customer's trust in the fact that the merchant will make an offer.
Because interacting agents are indeed heterogeneous, there are no guarantees about how they're implemented (hence the question about distinguishing malicious agents). Suppose the customer has some reasons to trust the merchant: What happens when the merchant is willing but practically unable to present the offer? This example shows the need for imposing a temporal ordering between the acquisition of consequence and the antecedent of commitments. To achieve such a temporal ordering, strong commitments can model the conditional commitment of the customer accepting the price quote. It won't be active until there's at least one possibility in the agent model to receive the merchant's offer.
We also present classical commitments on top of strong commitments (recall that strong commitments are a subset of classical commitments with an additional constraint) to preserve the flexibility provided by social commitment approaches and to capture the semantics defined by previous proposals. In this context, a weak commitment is a classical commitment that isn't strong. Informally, a weak commitment is active if the antecedent never holds-for example, a weak commitment can be used to model the commitment about presenting the offer if the merchant knows that the antecedent will never be satisfied (that is, there's no way for the customer to send the request). 6 The following example gives additional incentive for introducing strong commitments.
Example 2.
A pharmacist strongly commits to provide medicine only if the patient shows a prescription for that medicine and pays for it. 8 Notice that such antecedents are always possible.
Weak commitments aren't suitable for modeling the contractual business scenario discussed in Example 2 because it's ridiculous to commit to providing the medicine without showing a prescription and paying for it. Consequently, strong commitments are extremely necessary for addressing the weak commitment shortcoming of committing without satisfying the antecedent. In fact, strong commitments often give more confidence in terms of their fulfillments than classical commitments, which can be weak. For instance, when both payment and prescription are present, the fulfillment degree of the pharmacist's commitment to provide the requested medicine is very high.
Proposed Framework
Our proposed framework for conditional commitments encompasses three different but integrated parts: logical, algorithmic, and implementation (see Figure 1 ).
Logical Language
Interaction between autonomous and heterogeneous intelligent agents is the quintessential aspect of building open and effective multi-agent systems (MASs). Agents have to negotiate deals (such as price of goods and delivery terms), exchange information, and cooperate with each other to satisfy the individual and social goals that they can't achieve alone because of a lack of resources or knowledge. Munindar P. Singh 1 introduced four crucial criteria to a well-defined semantics for ACL messages in terms of social commitments:
• formality (using logics to define a formal semantics of agent messages to eliminate the possibility of ambiguity in their meaning);
• declarative (focusing on what social interactions and protocols are, to avoid overconstraining interactions, by specifying how interactions should be accomplished); • meaningfulness (focusing on message content and meaning, not on a message's representation as a token); and • verifiability (verifying if an agent is acting according to the semantics).
These criteria are defined from the perspective of agent communication; we introduce additional commitment-oriented criteria as follows:
• commitment modeling (specifying how the commitment is formally modeled, for example, as a fluent and temporal modality); • commitment semantics (defining a formal semantics for the commitment based on its modeling); and • verification method (specifying the technique to be used to verify the compliance of commitments and commitment protocols with specifications (model checking, monitoring, and so on). Such a criterion can help designers select a tool based on their own needs.
These criteria eliminate all the existing candidates for ACL semantics 9 Event calculus semantics 2 using fi rstorder logic (FOL), quite common and expressive in practice, is undecidable (that is, we can't develop a modelchecking algorithm that works for all kinds of formulae). Moreover, safety and liveness properties of commitment protocols, generally expressed using temporal operators, can't be expressed in the FOL. 4 Fluents-based semantics 2 waives the real semantics of commitments (because they're simply abstracted as fl uents), and temporal logic-based semantics (if applied to commitments as simple tokens) isn't meaningful. We argue that an approach formalized by extending the standard computation tree logic (CTL), where commitments are modal operators with grounded and intuitive semantics, can meet all of the requirements listed earlier. Indeed, CTL balances between expressiveness and verifi cation effi ciency (which is linear in both formula and model size). 9 In the logical part of our framework, we develop a branching-time temporal logic, CTL cf , that enriches CTL with modalities for conditional commitments and their fulfi llments.
Defi nition 1. Given a set of atomic propositions AP, the syntax of CTL cf is defi ned as follows:
where p ∈ AP is an atomic proposition; E is the existential quantifi er on paths; X, G, and U are CTL path modal connectives standing for "next," "globally," and "until," respectively; the Boolean connectives ¬ and ∨ are defi ned and read in the usual way; and Com and Ful stand for conditional commitments and their fulfi llment modalities, respectively. In this logic, a (strong) conditional commitment (SCC(i, j, y, f)) CC(i, j, y, f) is read as "agent i (strongly) commits toward agent j that f when the antecedent y holds," or equivalently from communication perspective as "i is (strongly) conveying information f to j after receiving information y." The antecedent y and consequence f in the context of commitment modality can be any arbitrary CTL cf formula, so they would be commitments as well. FuS(SCC(i, j, y, f) ) Fu(CC(i, j, y, f)) is read as "the (strong) conditional commitment (SCC(i, j, y, f) ) CC(i, j, y, f) is fulfi lled." Other Boolean connectives and temporal modalities can be defi ned in terms of the aforementioned connectives and modalities as usual-for example, f → y
where f 1 means that the merchant proactively presents a quote even without being requested by the customer; f 2 means there's a possibility for the customer to accept the price quote without requesting it; and f 3 states that there exists a path during which the merchant can commit to deliver the goods without asking the customer to accept the price (as in a trial offer). The business scenario mentioned in Example 2 would be formalized as follows:
which means that the pharmacist strongly commits to deliver medicine only if the patient shows the prescription and sends the payment. To keep CTL cf propositional, other commitment actions, missing in our previous work, 10 are abstracted as predicate propositions, which hold in social states precisely after performing agents' local actions, underlying the assumption saying that an agent performs one local action at a time. Before we introduce the logical model M to interpret CTL cf formulae, we briefl y describe the extended version of the interpreted system formalism we developed previously. 4, 5 This formalism in fact provides a standard framework for modeling and reasoning on fundamental classes of MASs, such as synchronous and asynchronous. Specifi cally, suppose a MAS is composed of a set Agt = {1, …, n} of n agents, wherein each agent i ∈ Agt is characterized by a countable set L i of local states, a countable set Act i of possible local actions, a local protocol Pr i : L i → 2 Act i that's a function producing the set of enabled actions at a given local state, and a local evolution function, which is defi ned by t i : L i × Act i → L i . The agents in Agt act within an "environment" (e), which in turn can be modeled with the set L e , set Act e , protocol Pr e , and evolution function t e . The environment e can be seen as a special agent because it captures any information that might not pertain to a specifi c agent. In principle, we can view a commitment protocol as an agent e.
Defi nition 2.
We represent the instantaneous confi guration of all agents in the system at a given time by the social state having (n + 1)-tuple g = (l e , l 1 , …, l n ), where each element l e ∈ L e and l i ∈ L i represents a local state of agent e and of agent i, respectively. Thus, the set of all social states G = L e × L 1 × … × L n is the Cartesian product of all local states of n + 1 agents.
The notation l i (g) represents the local state of agent i in social state g.
The social evolution function is defi ned as follows: t:G × ACT → G, with ACT = Act e × Act 1 × … × Act n , where each component a ∈ ACT is a "joint action," which is a tuple of actions (one for each agent). To account for communication that occurs during MAS execution, we associate with each i ∈ Agt a set Var i of at most n -1 local variables to represent communication channels through which messages are sent and received. The value of a variable x in the set Var i at local state l i (g) is denoted by l i x (g). The idea is that, for two agents i and j to communicate, they should share a communication channel, which is represented by a shared variable between them (that is,
means the values of x in l i x (g) for i and in l j x (gʹ) for j are the same. It's worth noticing that shared variables only motivate the existence of channels or pipes for communication, not the establishment of communication itself.
Defi nition 3. A model of communicative conditional commitments is a tuple
is a set of social states for the system. • R t ⊆ S × S is a total transition relation defi ned by (s, sʹ) ∈ R t iff there exists a joint action (a e , a 1 … a n ) ∈ ACT such that t (s, a e , a 1 … a n ) = sʹ. • For each pair (i, j) ∈ Agt 2 , ∼ i→j ⊆ S × S is a serial social accessibility relation defi ned by s ∼ i→j sʹ iff the following four conditions are true: • I ⊆ S is a set of initial social states for the system.
The model M conceptualizes time as a tree-like structure in which nodes correspond to the states of the system being considered, and branches represent all choices in the future that agents have when they participate in protocols (the past is linear). Concretely, the underlying abstract time domain in M is discrete such that the present moment refers to the current state, the next moment corresponds to the immediate successor state in a given path, and a transition represents a social interaction between agents and corresponds to the advance of a single time unit. We can unwind the model M into a set of computation paths to interpret a CTL cf formula. A path p = s 0 , s 1 , … in M is an infi nite sequence of reachable social states in S such that ∀i ≥ 0,
Because the semantics of CTL cf state formulae extends the standard semantics of CTL, we present only the semantics of commitments and their fulfi llments. social state s, denoted by (M, s) ⊨ f is recursively defined as follows:
Defi nition 4. Given model
The state formula CC(i, j, y, f) is satisfied in model M at s iff the consequence f holds in every state satisfying y and accessible via ∼ i→j . The semantics of the strong commitment SCC(i, j, y, f) is similar, but we add condition 1 ($ sʹ ∈ S s.t. s i→j sʹ and (M, sʹ) ⊨ y) to ensure that at least one accessible state satisfies antecedent y. The state formula Fu (CC(i, j, y, f) ) is satisfied in model M at s iff s satisfies the consequence f and the negation of the commitment CC(i, j, y, f), and there exists a state sʹ satisfying the commitment from which s is "seen" via ∼ i→j .
The idea behind this semantics is to say that a commitment is fulfilled when we reach an accessible state from the commitment state in which the consequence holds and the commitment becomes no longer active. The semantics of the strong fulfillment FuS (SCC(i, j, y, f) ) is similar, but the focus is on checking the satisfiability of antecedent y. This is because-from the semantics of the strong commitment-we guarantee that whenever y holds in an accessible state, then consequence f holds as well. The proposed semantics solves the fulfillment paradox, 4, 5 where the commitment is still active when it's fulfilled. Terminating commitment after being fulfilled is stated explicitly in the operational semantics introduced elsewhere. 2, 8 Furthermore, our logic doesn't include an additional operator for violation; instead, violation can be expressed as follows:
where x should be replaced by S if the commitment is strong and removed otherwise. The violation comes out when, after having the conditional commitment, the fulfillment doesn't occur in all states of every possible computation. By considering social commitments and their actions, our language allows designers to characterize the practical business scenarios that are sufficient to flexibly model business protocols and models. Following recent literature, 8 conditional commitment is a first-class citizen in our framework, and unconditional commitment can be obtained as abbreviation:
Symbolic algorithm for cTL cf
In the algorithmic part of our framework, we develop a new symbolic algorithm to directly address the problem of model-checking CTL cf , where the set ⟦f⟧ of states satisfying the formula f being checked are represented symbolically. Such an algorithm particularly extends the standard symbolic algorithm dedicated to CTL with five algorithms: one for each new modality and one for the accessibility relation. We adopt symbolic approaches because they need less memory than automata-based approaches, and their algorithms are applied to Boolean functions, not to Kripke structures. In practice, space requirements for Boolean functions that can be easily encoded in ordered binary decision diagrams (OBDDs) are exponentially smaller than for explicit Kripke structure representations. In a nutshell, given model M and CTL cf formula f, the problem of model-checking CTL cf is determining whether M is a model for f (that is, ∀ s ∈ I, we have (M, s) ⊨ f). Specifically, our symbolic algorithm (see Algorithm 1) takes model M and CTL cf formula f as input and returns the set ⟦f⟧ of states in M satisfying f. The algorithm operates recursively on the structure of f and builds the set ⟦f⟧ of states using the following operations on sets: complementation, union, and existential quantification. Lines 1 to 6 call the standard CTL algorithms; the algorithm then proceeds to call our subalgorithms (lines 7 to 10), which compute the set of states satisfying the (strong) commitments and their fulfillments. Due to space constraints, we won't present those subalgorithms here. 
Implementation and Experimental results
We fully implemented the modelchecking technique we've presented on top of the MCMAS symbolic model checker, 11 developed to automatically verify MASs formalized using interpreted systems. Such an implementation isn't an obvious task, nor is it trivial: we first need to extend the ISPL (the input language of MCMAS) with the shared and unshared variables needed for agent communication (social accessibility relation), and then add five developed subalgorithms along with other modifications of interest. We chose MCMAS because it supports the semantics of interpreted systems and CTL and performs OBDD operations via the efficient CUDD library. The extended version of MCMAS features a user interface (based on Eclipse; see Figure 2 ) that supports a wide range of features such as editing and tracking the modeled system, expressing properties, adding new agents, checking syntax, and starting verification. Moreover, thanks to its embedding in a Java archive, such a user interface can be seamlessly integrated with other applications that need model-checking commitments or other domain properties.
To experimentally test our algorithm's effectiveness, we adopted an electronic commerce protocol, NetBill, that's specifically designed for selling and delivering low-priced information goods over the Internet. The protocol regulates interactions between two agents (merchant Mer and customer Cus) and starts when Cus requests a quote for some desired good. This request is followed by Mer's reply with a price quote as an offer. Cus can then either reject the offer, and the protocol moves to the initial state, or accept the offer, which means Cus commits to send payment 
, V}, where the set Agt includes two agents (Cus and Mer) plus an environment agent (e), which we specifically use to publish and store the protocol itself in a public repository to be accessible by all participating agents. To verify the protocol specification, we used the safety (something bad never happens) and liveness (something good will eventually happen) properties formalized using our CTL cf . Formally, the safety property f 5 expresses the bad situation as Cus sends payment, but Mer never strongly commits to sending a receipt:
Cus, receivedPayment, EF receipt)).
The liveness property f 6 states that in all paths globally, if Mer delivers the goods, then there's a path such that in the future of that path Cus will strongly commit to send payment when it accepts the delivered goods:
Mer, acceptGoods, EF payment)).
We encoded the protocol as the environment agent, customer agent, and merchant agent along with the properties in our extended ISPL language and then verified it using the developed model checker. To test our algorithm's scalability, we report six experiments in Table 1 , where the number of reachable states, execution time in seconds, and memory in use are defined as a function of the number of agents. From this table, the number of reachable states reflects that the state space increases exponentially when the number of agents increases. However, the memory usage increases merely polynomially. With regard to the execution time, the increase isn't exponential but faster than the polynomial. Figure 3 depicts the verification results of the first experiment. In this figure, the properties (formulae) are evaluated into true or false along with the possibility to show a counterexample that demonstrates why the formula is false.
I n this article, we argued that the proposed framework for communicative conditional commitments is expressive and rich enough to accommodate scenarios of practical utility and remedy some limitations in current semantic models. As future work, we plan to define suitable semantic models for other commitment actions (Cancel, Release, and Delegate) and then develop their symbolic algorithms. We also plan to study the computational complexity of the overall model checking algorithm extended by those algorithms.
